The Plan
The RWA thesis, NVDA/USDG launch incentives, and operating philosophy behind Deepstate Protocol.
Superior price is the product
Deepstate is an attempt to make a fully onchain central limit order book practical enough to become the primary market, not merely a settlement venue. The goal is one thing: a superior executable price.
This is not a promise that the mechanism will work on day one. It is a plan to discover whether price-time priority, explicit capital at risk, and deliberately aggressive ownership turnover can produce a better market than passive liquidity incentives.
Deepstate may fail technically, economically, or socially. Tokenized assets, onchain markets, and protocol governance each introduce risks that participants should evaluate independently.
Why an order book
An AMM automates quoting from pooled inventory. A central limit order book asks market makers to compete directly on price, size, and time.
Deepstate stores bids and asks in radix trees and navigates the best-priced path with bounded tree work. That design is intended to make price-time matching practical on an EVM chain while keeping order placement, matching, custody, and settlement onchain.
The first RWA market
NVDA/USDG is the launch market and first proving ground for Deepstate's real-world-asset thesis. Tokenized equities need credible price discovery around earnings, market hours, corporate actions, and information arriving outside the chain. An order book lets professional makers express explicit prices, quantities, and inventory limits.
Deepstate's intended advantage is structural:
- Precise quoting. Makers choose exact prices and quantities.
- Visible discovery. Traders can inspect spread, depth, and executable priority.
- Capital efficiency. Makers place inventory where they believe it is useful.
- Fast repricing. Firm quotes can be updated or withdrawn as reference markets move.
- Competitive incentives. Rewards target the bid and ask that define the immediate market.
A CLOB does not make a tokenized equity trustworthy. Issuer solvency, custody, redemption rights, legal enforceability, corporate actions, market outages, and token upgrades remain external risks.
The technical order book is useful only when serious liquidity competes at its top. Deepstate therefore rewards only the maker holding the best bid and the maker holding the best ask in NVDA/USDG. Moving one tick ahead moves the reward stream.
One tick of price priority moves the reward stream. Quantity affects the reward only after an order is best.
Resting away from the top remains useful market depth, but it is not subsidized.
The participation loop
- A maker places an NVDA/USDG bid or ask.
- If the order becomes top of its side, eligible exposure begins accruing.
- The maker claims DEEP from the rewarder's fixed prefunded allocation.
- Depositing DEEP into the STATE vault burns it permanently and mints STATE.
- STATE carries voting power and can redeem pro-rata USDG or an explicit list of vault assets.
- Anyone may purchase complete listed fee balances from the vault for exactly 10,000 USDG.
DEEP is the reward and vault-deposit token. STATE is the voting vault share. USDG is the vault's fixed value token. NVDA and other assets held by the vault are available through caller-selected multi-asset redemption.
Fixed launch rewards
The launch deployment prefunds one NVDA/USDG rewarder with exactly 1 billion DEEP:
| Program | Maximum | Duration after side activation |
|---|---|---|
| NVDA/USDG | 1,000,000,000 DEEP | 395 days |
The allocation is split equally between bid and ask. Each side starts independently when its first top order appears, follows a front-loaded logarithmic ceiling, and permanently loses reward capacity not earned during its interval.
The curve is a distribution ceiling, not new minting. Actual claims are lower when the best order is below the target, and unused prefunded rewards remain locked.
The 1 billion DEEP is minted into the rewarder during deployment. Claims transfer that prefunded balance; the rewarder has no MINTER_ROLE. The token itself has no hard supply cap, and STATE governance can authorize a separate future minter through a proposal.
Fast governance
The finite reward allocation moves potential ownership toward useful market-making activity. Makers can burn earned DEEP for STATE; holders who stop contributing can be diluted as others earn and deposit DEEP.
The mechanism is dilution, not confiscation. Passive holders keep their tokens, but their ownership percentage can fall. This may keep governance close to active market operators; it may also produce mercenary liquidity, concentrated early control, and unstable politics.
Protocol and company
Deep State Incorporated operates deepstate.sh. The company chooses which pools appear in that interface, handles listings, hosts the product, and receives any disclosed interface fee.
The company is not the matching contract. The deployed engine is intended to be permissionless, non-custodial, non-upgradeable, and directly usable by other interfaces.
| Layer | Responsibility | Control |
|---|---|---|
| Deepstate contracts | Books, matching, settlement, protocol fee, hooks, vault, rewards | STATE governance within deployed capabilities |
deepstate.sh | Listings, presentation, routing, hosting, interface fee | Deep State Incorporated |
| Third-party interfaces | Their own listings, routing, and optional fees | Their operators |
| Market makers | Prices, quantities, inventory, and claims | Each maker |
Fees and vault value
The official interface is configured to charge 10 basis points for the protocol and 10 basis points for Deep State Incorporated. Direct and third-party integrations do not owe the company fee unless their routing chooses to pay it.
| Fee | Recipient | Rate |
|---|---|---|
| Protocol | STATE vault | 10 bps |
| Interface | Deep State Incorporated | 10 bps |
| Official frontend total | 20 bps | |
Protocol fees sent to the vault can be redeemed pro-rata by STATE holders. A caller can redeem USDG alone with redeemValue, or supply a list to redeemAssets for ERC-20 balances and native ETH. Anyone can also purchase complete listed fee balances through buyFees for a fixed 10,000 USDG payment to the vault.
Narrow governance
The contract set gives STATE governance power to:
- set the router's protocol fee recipient and rate, capped at 100 basis points;
- attach, replace, activate, or deactivate pool reward hooks;
- grant or revoke DEEP roles, including
MINTER_ROLE; - change governor timing, proposal-threshold percentage, quorum fraction, and late-quorum extension; and
- transfer or renounce ownership of contracts it owns.
Governance cannot upgrade deployed logic, block permissionless pool creation, choose listings on deepstate.sh, impose the company interface fee, rewrite the rewarder's immutable schedule, or change the vault's fixed 10,000 USDG fee-purchase price.
| Area | Control after bootstrap |
|---|---|
| Router fee and recipient | STATE Governor |
| Per-pool reward hooks | STATE Governor |
| DEEP minter authority | STATE Governor |
| Vault ownership | STATE Governor; fixed economic entry points remain permissionless |
| Governor timing and quorum | STATE Governor through governance proposals |