Governance
Direct 2DEEP voting, proposal timing, guardians, and the protocol's ownership graph.
2DEEP is the protocol's voting token. It implements OpenZeppelin ERC20Votes, uses timestamp checkpoints, and self-delegates a recipient when that address receives tokens while it has no delegate.
Live configuration
| Setting | Value | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Proposal start | September 25, 2026 at 00:23:44 UTC | One-time deployment gate |
| Voting delay | 3 days | Wall-clock seconds |
| Voting period | 7 days | Wall-clock seconds |
| Proposal threshold | 1% | Prior 2DEEP supply, rounded up |
| Quorum | 10% | 2DEEP supply at voting snapshot |
| Minimum quorum | 1 2DEEP | Absolute floor |
| Late-quorum extension | 1 day | Wall-clock seconds |
| Execution timelock | None | Successful proposals may execute immediately |
The proposal-start gate is distinct from the voting delay. Before the start timestamp, propose reverts. Once proposal creation is open, each proposal still waits the configured 3-day voting delay before voting begins.
Supply-relative voting
The proposal threshold is calculated from the prior timestamp's 2DEEP total supply and rounded up. Quorum is calculated from total supply at the proposal's voting snapshot. Both therefore move with 2DEEP issuance and burning rather than depending on legacy STATE supply.
Only delegated voting power counts. A transfer can change future checkpoints, but cannot retroactively alter a proposal's snapshot.
Ownership and operational roles
| Area | Control after bootstrap |
|---|---|
| Router fee and recipient | 2DEEP Governor |
| Per-pool reward hooks | Rewarder Factory V3, owned by the 2DEEP Governor; Treasury multisig is operator |
| 2DEEP minter authority | 2DEEP Governor; Rewarder Factory V3 holds the only other persistent minter role |
| Router ownership | Rewarder Factory V3; its owner may return control to the 2DEEP Governor |
| Governor timing and quorum | 2DEEP Governor through governance proposals |
The Governor is the sole 2DEEP default administrator and one of two persistent minters. Rewarder Factory V3 is the other minter so it can fully fund each market atomically.
The Governor owns Rewarder Factory V3. The Factory owns the Router and each V3 rewarder. The Treasury multisig is the Factory's operator, allowing the team to deploy or permanently remove markets without controlling token roles, protocol fees, Factory ownership, or the Governor.
Factory owner-only actions include changing the operator, transferring Factory ownership, and returning direct Router ownership to the Factory owner. Permanent Factory ownership renunciation is disabled.
What governance can do
| Capability | Exact effect |
|---|---|
| Proposal execution | Call any target with calldata and ETH from the Governor address; target access controls still apply |
| 2DEEP cap | Raise or lower the supply cap; a cap below current supply blocks all new minting |
| 2DEEP roles | Grant or revoke the single MINTER_ROLE and administer other AccessControl roles |
| Protocol fees | Set the Router fee recipient and rate, capped by the Router at 100 bps |
| Market operations | Act directly as Factory owner or replace/revoke its operator |
| Router custody | Instruct the Factory to return Router ownership to the Governor |
| Voting settings | Change voting delay, voting period, threshold numerator, quorum, and late-quorum extension within contract bounds |
| Guardians | Add or remove addresses permitted to cancel unexecuted proposals |
| Treasury assets | Manage protocol fees, harvested USDG, and Governor-owned Uniswap v4 positions through proposals |
Guardians
No guardian was configured at deployment. Governance may call setGuardian(address, enabled) to add or remove an address that may cancel an unexecuted proposal. Guardians cannot create proposals, vote, execute, change settings, or move protocol assets merely by holding that designation.
No timelock
There is no separate timelock contract. A successful proposal can execute as soon as its voting and any late-quorum extension have ended. Voters and integrators must monitor proposals during their pending and active periods; there is no guaranteed post-vote escape window.
Legacy governance
DGP-003 hardened the old STATE Governor rather than leaving a practical parallel governance path. Its voting delay and voting period are each 30 days, late-quorum extension is 7 days, and quorum is 100%.
All known legacy DEEP minters were revoked. The legacy DEEP default-admin role was granted to the legacy token contract itself and renounced by the old Governor, leaving no callable account able to administer legacy token roles.