Governance
STATE voting, the launch clock, and the exact limits of protocol ownership.
STATE is both the vault share and voting token. It implements OpenZeppelin ERC20Votes, uses timestamp checkpoints, and self-delegates a recipient on the first vault mint only when that recipient has no existing delegate.
Launch configuration
Implemented on merged protocol master · interface entry hidden for launch| Setting | Launch value | Unit |
|---|---|---|
| Proposal lock after deployment | 15 days | Wall-clock seconds |
| Voting delay | 3 days | Wall-clock seconds |
| Voting period | 7 days | Wall-clock seconds |
| Proposal threshold | 1% | Historical STATE supply, rounded up |
| Quorum | 10% | Historical STATE supply |
| Late-quorum extension | 1 day | Wall-clock seconds |
| Execution timelock | None | Approved proposals may execute immediately |
A proposal created at the first permitted second cannot finish its normal voting period before approximately day 25: 15 days locked, 3 days pending, then 7 days active.
The governor rejects a voting token that does not expose the ERC-6372 timestamp clock. Days are measured with block.timestamp, not estimated from block numbers.
Bootstrap ownership and roles
The governor becomes the DEEP token administrator and owner of the router, vault, and NVDA/USDG rewarder. The deployer renounces DEEP's admin role.
The rewarder is prefunded with 1 billion DEEP and receives no MINTER_ROLE. The deployment temporarily grants the deployer mint authority only long enough to fund the rewarder, then revokes it. An optional additional DEEP_MINTER can be configured, but production should leave it unset unless that authority is explicitly required and disclosed.
Before governanceStart, propose reverts, so owner-only surfaces held by the governor are intentionally inaccessible.
Proposal threshold and quorum
The proposal threshold is recalculated from the prior timestamp's total STATE supply and rounded up. A proposer must hold or receive at least that many delegated votes. The absolute-threshold OpenZeppelin setter is disabled; governance can change only the percentage numerator.
Quorum is 10% of historical total STATE supply. Only votes delegated and cast count. Minting STATE does not retroactively alter an existing proposal's threshold or quorum snapshot.
What governance can do
| Capability | Exact effect |
|---|---|
| Proposal execution | Call any target with calldata and ETH from the governor address; the target's access controls still apply |
| Router fee | Set the global protocol fee recipient and a rate from 0 to 100 bps |
| Pool hooks | Attach, replace, activate, or deactivate one reward hook for either side of any pool |
| DEEP roles | Grant and revoke MINTER_ROLE and administer other AccessControl roles |
| Voting delay and period | Change the pending and active voting windows |
| Proposal threshold | Change the historical-supply percentage needed to propose |
| Quorum fraction | Change the historical-supply percentage required for quorum |
| Late-quorum extension | Change the extra voting window triggered by late quorum |
| Ownership | Transfer or renounce ownership of contracts the governor owns |
The launch rewarder's pool, token pair, side cap, duration, and quantity schedule are immutable. Governance can replace its hook, but it cannot rewrite that contract's economics or withdraw its unearned DEEP balance.
The vault has no owner-set auction, sweep destination, value-token setter, or fee-purchase price setter. redeemValue, redeemAssets, and buyFees are permissionless subject to share ownership, allowances, asset restrictions, and the fixed contract rules.
What governance cannot do
Governance has no function to:
- upgrade or replace deployed bytecode;
- block permissionless pool creation or direct contract use;
- choose which pools appear on
deepstate.sh; - set or receive the company interface fee;
- seize user orders or bypass order ownership checks;
- increase the existing rewarder's immutable side caps;
- withdraw unearned DEEP from the rewarder;
- alter the vault's fixed 10,000 USDG fee-purchase price; or
- alter NVDA, USDG, Robinhood Chain, or any external token contract.
| Area | Control after bootstrap |
|---|---|
| Router fee and recipient | STATE Governor |
| Per-pool reward hooks | STATE Governor |
| DEEP minter authority | STATE Governor |
| Vault ownership | STATE Governor; fixed economic entry points remain permissionless |
| Governor timing and quorum | STATE Governor through governance proposals |
No timelock
OpenZeppelin settings, quorum, role administration, and late-quorum setters are governed through proposals. There is no separate timelock contract, so an approved proposal can execute as soon as it succeeds.
This removes a post-vote escape window. Voters and integrators must monitor active proposals rather than relying on a queued execution delay.
Fast governance
The fixed NVDA/USDG reward allocation can distribute potential voting ownership quickly to active market makers, but it is finite rather than perpetual. Rapid early distribution may keep governance close to current operators; it can also concentrate control among well-capitalized early makers. Delegation, voter apathy, inventory concentration, and short-term farming remain independent risks.
See The Plan, Emission Schedule, and Risks.